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I. INTRODUCTION - THE ENIGMA MACHINE
This study traces the pre-World War II efforts of Polish,
French, and British intelligence organizations to acquire
and read Nazi communications enciphered on the electro-
mechanical Enigma device. Since the study examines those
efforts in a historical and human context, no technical
explanation of the cryptanalytic processes is included within
the text. Yet, in order to follow the unfolding story, some
description is needed of the scope of the Enigma problem
these organizations faced. The following paragraphs are
essentially a distillation of the already admirably non-
technical explanations of the principles and cryptanalytic
difficulties of Enigma provided by Ronald Lewin and Peter
2Calvocoressi .
The Enigma machine resembled a primitive electric type-
writer and, in grossly oversimplified terms, operated in
somewhat the same way. Depressing a key on the keyboard
generated an electrical pulse that, rather than causing the
selected letter to be imprinted on paper, caused a different
letter to light up on a second "keyboard." That second
letter was then used in the cipher text to replace the
original letter. Had the process been that simple, however,
the Germans would not have believed their communications to
be so secure, and many fewer books would have been written
about the Allied cryptanalytic successes against Enigma.

The difficulty that makes the Enigma story astounding was
caused by the interposition of various complicating devices
between the first and second keyboards, and by the fact that
these devices caused a different cipher letter to be selected
for a given key each time it was pressed. That is, the first
time A was pressed it might become Q, but the next time it
would be L or Z or anything but Q.
For example, the maze of wiring through which the
electrical pulse had to travel was partly distributed on
3three rotating wheels or rotors. Each wheel contained entry
and exit points on its rim for 26 letters. Each was wired
differently and the wheels could be placed in any order in
the machine, giving a possibility of six different wheel
combinations for three wheels.
When a letter on the keyboard was struck, the electrical
impulse travelled a crazy route through the three rotating
wheels, struck a reflector and travelled back by a different
route through the same three st i 1
1
-rotati ng wheels.
Also, by 1930 plugs (somewhat like those on an old-
fashioned telephone switchboard) were added to the machine
to link pairs of letters and thus further vary the path a
given electrical impulse would travel between the two
keyboards .
German units which were to encipher and decipher messages
using the Enigma machine were provided with lists of settings
for the beginning positions of the rotors and plugs for use

during specified periods. If both sender and receiver set
the machine up properly according to these lists, the
receiver would type the cipher text into the machine, and
the original plaintext letters would light up.
Besides these purely electro-mechanical complications,
there was also a key embedded at the beginning of each
message which indicated the initial positions of the three
wheels, e.g., first wheel set at A, second at L, third at C.
These three-letter groups were provided by the same handbook
that gave the wheel orders and plug connections for a
specified 24-hour period. The three-letter group was
enciphered twice at the beginning of the message (hence, a
preambular key), e.g., ABCABC might become QULBDR.
The problem faced by cryptanal ysts in the late 1 920 '
s
and early 1930's, then, was essentially: first, to deduce
the basic wirings of the wheels and plugs; and second, to
devise ways of determining wheel orders and plug settings
and the preambular key for a particular day.
Nothing is known about British or French approaches to
this problem, except that they were apparently not successful,
but it is known that it was attacked by Polish cryptanal ysts
as a problem in theoretical mathematics. They constructed
an equation describing Enigma's permutations - the number of
different states in which the machine might be at any given
moment - and then solved it by establishing and then
exploiting, certain critical mechanical facts about the

wheel operations. Since the total number of theoretical
permutations was above the billions - Calvocoressi notes the
4figure contained 88 digits - the solution and consequent
reconstruction of the Enigma machine in Poland represents an
incredible feat.
Having once done this, however, the cryptanalysts still
had to determine the daily settings and key. This was
theoretically possible if all of the possible permutations
were tested, but obviously impractical if it was intended to
decipher messages in the same century in which they were
enciphered - especially since all early deciphering was done
by hand.
The obvious point of attack was the preambular key.
Given a 26-letter alphabet, there were "only" 17,576 possible
sets of three-letter groups. Also, review of intercepted
German messages revealed that identical sets of three-letter
groups were turning up more often than chance would dictate,
which implied that some German operators were violating the
rules of randomness by using standard groups, like AAA, ABC,
or German words like 1ST or VON. Since the key was doubly
enciphered, if for example, ABCABC or I ST I ST were used, the
cryptanalysts knew that the first and fourth, second and fifth,
and third and sixth letters were identical. Using these hints,
the cryptanalysts made sufficiently educated guesses to
reduce to manageable proportions the time required to solve
a daily setting and key.

Calvocoressi notes that faulty operating procedures -
such as the double encipherment of the preambular key - and
failures to observe the rules - such as using common three-
letter groups or words as keys - were ultimately the only
two practical ways into the Enigma system.
Prior to September 1938, these two methods were success-
fully used by the Poles for more than six years to read
German Enigma traffic. In September and December 1938,
however, the Germans introduced two changes which effectively
shut the Poles out of Enigma, not because of a theoretical or
technical inability to solve the changes, but because of a
lack of time and money to develop appropriate aids to solve
them fast enough for practical purposes.
The first change was procedural: instead of a single
designated preambular key for all messages in a 24-hour
period, German operators were directed to select their own
random three-letter groups, and to use a different one for
each message. Therefore, solving a key would permit only one
message to be read rather than all the messages for that day.
The Poles were well on their way to solving this new
problem, by devising and constructing additional aids to
speed up the testing process (such as the perforated sheets
and the Polish "bombs"), when these processes were thrown
into a cocked hat by a technical change in December 1938:
two additional rotors were made available to operators, so
that any three of five differently wired wheels could be
10

emplaced on the Enigma machine at one time. The Poles
deduced the wirings of these two wheels successfully, but
were unable to exploit them. Now, instead of six possible
wheel orders to test for daily settings, there were sixty.
Therefore, the "bombe," which consisted of parts of six
Enigmas wired together in such a way as to test the six
possible wheel orders quickly, would require 60 Enigmas.
And the other primary aid, the perforated sheets, would
require 60 series of laboriously hand drawn and cut sheets
rather than the six that previously sufficed. The Poles
lacked the economic resources to create the aids they knew
were required so that, although they had been reading German
Enigma traffic for years, they were now shut out of Enigma
until January 1940, when the first Allied break into Enigma
was made by Poles located at a French cryptologic center on
British-manufactured copies of the Polish perforated-sheet
design.
This, then, was the scope of the Enigma problem, and the
nature of the attacks against it. Although the British
virtually redesigned the "bombe" and invented other more
sophisticated mechanical and electronic aids, they all were
designed to speed up the testing process for the approaches
used originally by the Poles: they exploited faulty
operating procedures such as double encipherment of the
preambular key (until this was cancelled by the Germans in
May 1940), and they exploited the German operators' violation
11

of procedural rules, either by use of "cribs" - guessing of
common three-letter groups in keys or of standard words or
phrases elsewhere in a message - or because a message had
been enciphered both in a lower-grade cipher and in an Enigma
cipher. A break into the simpler low-grade cipher then gave
one a break into Enigma for that day.
As to the prize that resulted from all of these efforts,
the quality and volume of intelligence on German order-of-
battle, movements, and intentions have been amply described










Goes to War: The First Account of
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.
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Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret
1981), pp. 23-39, 53^9":
3. There was also a fourth stationary wheel which operated
as a reflector. Until an Enigma with four rotating
wheels was introduced in the German Navy in 1943, all
Enigmas utilized only three wheels at a time, though
sometimes those three could be selected from among a
larger number available.
4. Calvocoressi, p. 29.
5. Ibid., p. 54.
6. Actually, the Poles continued to read a small part of
the Enigma traffic - that of the SD ( Sicherhei tsdi ens t
)
until July 1939, when the SD's procedures were brought
into line with those of the other Enigma users.
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II. NEEDLES AND HAYSTACKS
Since 1973, Enigma/Ultra literature - comprising both
memoirs and scholarly analyses - has grown enormously. While
many of these works have helped to clarify the use and impact
of Enigma decrypts during the war, every additional book or
article adds as much confusion as clarity to the pre-war
period of the Enigma/Ultra story, when the Intelligence
Services of at least three countries were pursuing this
outstanding source. At this point, any publication which
recounts "Ultra's pre- hi story" in the 1930' s and early
1940's is essentially reduced to selecting among the several,
and often contradictory, versions available from participants
This is due largely to three major factors: a lack of
available official documentation from the pre-war and early
war years, the time-honored intelligence principle of need-
to-know, and the enormous complexity of a situation of which
each participant saw only a small part.
Although a wealth of official and unofficial material has
now been released or written on Enigma, no documentation
prior to 1940 has reached the public domain, which could
confirm or deny the specific events cited by the various
authors. Therefore, one author states firmly that British
Enigma operations at Bletchley Park (known hereinafter and
to habitues as B.P.) grew from an Enigma machine stolen by
14

the Polish Intelligence Service on behalf of the British
2Intelligence Service, while others convincingly describe
independent Polish reconstruction and exploitation of Enigma,
with some documentary assistance from the French and a
subsequent gift of the Polish accomplishments to Britain and
3France. As recently as 1982, Gordon Welchman's memoirs
allow the casual reader to believe that al 1 stories may be
4
correct. While I don't completely agree with Gordon Welchman,
(see pp. 52-56 below) the absence of any solid documentation
from this period, such as reports filed at the time by
participants, makes absolute refutation of any story impossible
That is, while it may be possible in some cases to establish
plausibly that an event probably did happen (as Gustave
Bertrand "proves" with dated postcards that he was in Latvia
and Lithuania on certain relevant dates ), it is generally
not possible to prove that a specific event did not happen
somewhere in the netherworld of intelligence.
The material released from official sources thus far
seems to follow a pattern so traditional in the intelligence
profession that it has the force of "law". National interest/
prestige, political considerations from national leaders,
etc., may require the release of information and/or documen-
tation on intelligence facts, processes, use, or impact, but
never never on the sources from which it was derived or the
methods by which it was extracted. Therefore, Bertrand's
1973 book concerned Polish sources and methods but, except
15

for a German spy who was shot in 1943, does not reveal much
about French intelligence operations.
Likewise, Wi nterbotham ' s book essentially begins at the
point where the Enigma ciphers were already broken, and
continues with information on the dissemination, use, and
impact of the intelligence which resulted. That later
British writers have discussed some details of the deciphering
procedures can be attributed to the third group of
participants, the Poles.
This group was in a unique position by the time information
became public; they were writing about sources and methods of
intelligence acquisition in and for a nation-state which
effectively no longer existed. Consequently, feeling no
continuity between those events and the present government,
they presumably did not feel bound by some of the unwritten
laws as did the British and the French.
Unfortunately (if one is a historian), the release of
official data to the public has followed essentially the
same lines: the French have released nothing, and the
British little besides the intercepts and decrypted messages
that resulted from the complex international intelligence
collection operation that preceded it. The Poles involved
have provided such information as they recall or for which
they have records, but can hardly be expected to have carted
large amounts of collateral documentary evidence out of
Warsaw with them in September 1939.
16

Adding to the "fog of battle" in writing on the history
of intelligence is another- time-honored principle of the
profession: need-to-know. If the "sources-and-methods " rule
can be described as a way of ensuring the protection of the
most important aspects of an intelligence operation (in effect,
protecting the goose more stringently than its golden eggs),
then the "need-to-know" rule is a broad-brush way of limiting
the damage which any one individual can cause to the goose,
its eggs, the house it lives in, and its owners. That is,
theoretically at least, no-one has any more pieces of information
about any intelligence operation than he or she needs to do
his or her part successfully.
In the Enigma/Ultra operation, this means that no one
person writing from his own experiences as a participant
could possibly provide a complete picture. Each is hamstrung
in describing his own service's participation by the need-to-
know principle; and completely defeated in even hazarding a
guess about another country's participation by the sources-
and-methods principle, which operates nearly as well against
another country's intelligence service, even if friendly, as
it does against releasing information on sources and methods
to the publ i c .
The limitations of view of the participants involved,
caused largely by the rules of the intelligence game, then,
have thus far precluded a balanced critical recounting from
any of the "insiders" in the exceedingly complex developments
17

of an already very shadowy arena. From British, French, or
Polish tales of these events, the impression derived is that
the Enigma successes were due essentially to a single
country's efforts, with occasional and usually trivial
assistance from the other two countries.
Actually, probably the most important premise in under-
standing developments in the collection and initial exploi-
tation phases of the Enigma story is that the framework of
the story is one of three totally separate and distinct
efforts under way throughout the 1930's, one Polish, one
French, and one British. Although these efforts had the
same goal - use of decrypted Enigma messages to gain intel-
ligence on Nazi Germany - none was begun or continued purely
as a partnership. Each of the countries involved did what
was necessary to advance its own intelligence collection and
exploitation program against Enigma, cooperating with the
others (i.e., sharing anything acquired or developed within
the Service) only whenever and however it appeared to be
useful in advancing its own program and contributing to its
own national security.
What follows, then, is an attempt to find three
individual needles in three separate and complex haystacks,
and to follow the threads attached to each of the needles to





1 . Lewi n
,
p. 11.
2. F.W. Wi nterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper
and Row, 1 974)
, pp. 10-11.
3. Jozef Garlinski, Intercept: The Enigma War (London:
J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1979), pp. 12-27, 33-47).
4. Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma
Codes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 13-16.
5. Gustave Bertrand, Enigma, ou la plus grande enigme de la
guerre 1939-1945 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1973), p. 41.
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III. THE NEEDLES ARE THREADED (1926-1938)
A. GENERAL
As with any intelligence collection operation, the
efforts against Enigma began with the identification of the
target - in this case, the introduction in 1926 of the Enigma
ciphering machine into the German Armed Forces.
While the potential of electrically-operated ciphering
machines for providing a secure means of communications was
being investigated by other major countries in the 19 20' s,
Germany was apparently the first to adopt one as standard
issue throughout its governmental operations. First of its
armed forces to employ Enigma was the Navy, in 1926, followed
by the Army in 1928, and the Air Force in 1934. By the
start of the war in 1939, most high-level German military
communications, as well as those of the German diplomatic
corps and of intelligence agents abroad, were either encrypted
by Enigma machines prior to transmission or carried by landlines
This commonality may have made the Allied cryptanal ysts
job somewhat easier than if there had been a variety of
machines in use, but it did not mean that a single break into
Enigma gave access to all German communications. Each of the
services utilized somewhat different versions of the Enigma,
and there was a wide variety of codes in use, as well as
difficulties presented by the changeable settings utilized to
encode during different time periods.
20

The Germans, who had done considerable testing of the
security aspect of Enigma prior to adopting it for broad
high-level use, were probably theoretically justified in
believing that the Enigma-based ciphers were invulnerable
unless one had the machine, the keys, and the current setting
2for those keys. Unfortunately for the long-range goals of
the Third Reich, the Poles were able to gain continuing
"possession" of all three items by reconstructing them
through a small French hook into the German Cipher Office,
brilliant Polish theoretical work, and sloppy German oper-
ational practices. Not one of these three factors could have
permitted the astounding success eventually enjoyed through-
out the 1930's by the Poles and throughout the war years by
the British; all three were necessary to enable continuing
success against the Enigma ciphers.
B. THE POLISH NEEDLE
The Enigma history from the Polish perspective is based
almost entirely on memoirs written in the late 1960's and
31970's, although some material dates from as early as 1940.
The absence of official documents from the 1930's is not due,
in this case, to an unwillingness to release intelligence-
related material to the public, but to the not surprising
fact that most if not all records of the Enigma operation
were destroyed in September 1939 to ensure that the Nazi
4
conquerors did not learn of the Polish success. The major
21

documents providing the Polish perspective are reminiscences
by Marian Rejewski, one of the three cryptologists who
solved Enigma, his several responses to authors working in
5
this area, and a lengthy memorandum written in May 1974,
and supplemented in December 1974, by Colonel Stefan Mayer,
Chief of Polish Intelligence during the 1930' s and, in
London, during the war years. Colonel Mayer notes that his
memorandum is based on his memory to some extent, but also
on some papers left to him by a more immediate participant
in the Enigma story, Lt. Col. Gwido Langer, Chief of the
Cryptologic Bureau of Polish Intelligence. Langer's papers
include a report on specific cipher work done by his unit
g
in France between September 1939 and June 1940, as well as
g
some reminiscences written in 1946 in London. These
materials form the basis for all accounts published thus far
on the Polish side, except insofar as French and British
writers have written their perceptions of Polish activities
as they recalled them.
In reviewing the Polish side of the Enigma story, it is
well to remember the general situation of that nation between
World War I and World War II.
Poland had been established, divided, subjugated, and
liberated at various times since its period of greatness in
the 18th Century. It regained its independent national
identity yet again in 1918, but was well aware that its
independent status would be difficult to maintain from its
22

geographic position, sandwiched between its two traditional
conquerors: Prussia, now incorporated into Germany, and
Russia, now Bolshevik rather than Czarist, but still a threat
to a poor and militarily weak Poland.
The reality of the Russian threat to Poland was proven
by the war of 1920-1921, when Poland's cryptologic success
contributed significantly to the Polish victory.
Although both Russia and Germany were economically and
militarily weak during the 1920's, either or both were
sufficiently threatening to an even poorer and weaker Poland
to cause the latter to keep close tabs on the political and
military developments of its traditional enemies. Lacking
the economic and military strength to defend itself through
classic means, Poland emphasized relatively cheap methods in
which individual skills had reaped critical benefits in its
1 2past: intelligence and diplomacy.
Diplomatic efforts generally sought to keep Poland on
reasonably good terms with its neighbors, and to establish
and maintain alliances with nations which had the military
strength to compensate for Poland's weakness. Maintenance
of the traditional Polish-French ties falls in this latter
category. A close diplomatic and military relationship with
Great Britain, on the other hand, was not traditional; the




In the intelligence realm, Poland's exposed geographic
position caused it to focus most assiduously on activities
1 3
in Germany and Russia, and Poland may have been the first
nation to note signs of what was the worst possible develop-
ment from Poland's point of view: a growing rapprochement
1 4between its two traditional enemies. This closeness
between Russia and Germany would have caused even more
emphasis to be given by the Polish government to any means
which might improve its knowledge of the capabilities and
intentions of its two potential adversaries. Given Poland's
location between Russia and Germany, and traditional Polish
expertise in cryptology, intercepted and deciphered radio
1 5
communications was a logical area of focus.
In this context, it is not surprising that the appearance
of the Enigma machine in the German Armed Forces in 1926 was
soon recognized as potentially shutting off what had been a
very lucrative source of intelligence on Germany. Polish
intelligence focussed quickly on deciphering this new style
of cipher, but to no avail.
Whether from a greater consciousness of relative poverty
(i.e., they couldn't throw money at the problem in hopes of
simply overwhelming it) or from a greater sense of dangerous
geographic exposure, or for some other reason, the Poles then
took an approach that apparently didn't occur to the French
or the British: they went outside their small corps of
cryptol ogists to recruit fresh mathematical talent, possibly
24

on the assumption that an entirely new kind of cipher might
best be broken by an entirely new approach to deciphering.
To this end, a cryptology course was organized in 1929
for the best of the higher mathematics students at Poznan
University. The three top graduates of that course, Jerzy
Roczyki , Henryk Zigalski, and Marian Rejewski, were then
offered jobs in the cryptology section of the Intelligence
e . 18Servi ce
.
After some time spent on traditional hand ciphers, in
October 1932, Rejewski was told to work on a "new" cipher
separately from his two colleagues, who joined him two months
later. He made some progress in determining the principles
involved in the cipher, and has indicated that he was also
helped somewhat in initial familiarity with the general




On 8 or 9 December 1932, one Captain Gustave Bertrand,
Chief of the French Army Intelligence Service's Cryptology
Section, provided several documents, acquired from the German
Cipher Office by a spy, describing some of the technical
characteristics of the military Enigma. By the end of that
21
month, Enigma was broken. The security of the vaunted
impregnable machine-based cipher had been breached by three




From then until September 1938, the Polish crypto! ogi sts
proved equal to every procedural change the Germans introduced.
By January 1938, according to Col. Mayer and Marian Rejewski,
their reading of Enigma traffic was so routine and current
that Col. Mayer measured a 75% success rate in a 2-week test
in which he randomly selected incoming intercepts to be
22deci phered
.
Interestingly, but typical of dealings between intelligence
services of different countries, the Poles apparently never
told the French during this time of their success in breaking
Enigma. Whatever the specific agreement may have been when
Bert rand turned over the Enigma documents, it is probably
fair to assume that the French expected to share in any
23progress or success against Enigma. Since the documents
turned over in December 1932 were all the French had to
offer, however, there was nothing further to be gained from
the Polish perspective by giving the French access to the
results of the Polish attack on Enigma. So, the "family
jewels" were kept within Polish channels.
There was some continuing cooperation with the French
and with the Czechs, though apparently not with the British.
Raw (i.e., undeci phered ) intercepts were exchanged among the
French, Czech, and Polish cryptology units, possibly as early
as Bertrand's visit to Poland and Czechoslovakia in December
241932, and this exchange system was developed into a
25
communications network in 1938. The network was called
26

BLR, after the code names of the three cryptology chiefs:
Bertrand was Bolek, Lt. Col. Gwido Langer of Poland was Luc,
and Frantisek Moravec of Czechoslovakia was Raoul . Communi-
2 6
cation was by radio; although no information is available
on the location or nature of the Czech and French reception
points, the Polish leg of the triad was located in the Pyry
Forest near Warsaw, adjacent to the concrete blockhouse-type
27
structure that housed the Polish Enigma efforts.
By December 1938, the efforts against Enigma in the Pyry
Forest had been somewhat systematized. Several aids had been
invented and manufactured to assist and speed-up the deciphering
efforts. These included a mechanical contrivance, the "bombe",
which was an electro-mechanical lash-up of parts of six
Enigma machines that could rapidly test possible combinations
28
of letters in an Enigma key. In addition, there were
"improved" hand methods, such as the so-called "perforated
sheets", which were 51x51 charts of letters (26 sheets to a
set), with holes distributed in such a way that proper
stacking of the sheets would result in the correct letter
29being revealed by a direct line of holes in each sheet.
As happens all too frequently in intelligence, however,
just as the Poles had collection, exploitation, and pro-
duction of this intelligence working just right, the rest
of the world shifted gears, throwing the Polish efforts into




Disarray in the Enigma deciphering system was caused by
two kinds of changes introduced by the Germans during 1938:
in September substantial procedural changes were made, which
shut the Poles out for about two months, and in December a
much more damaging change occurred when two rotors were added
to the Army and Air Force Enigma. This change effectively
shut down all intelligence from Enigma deciphers until
January 1940, because the Polish mechanical and paper aids
were rendered useless. They required redesign and remanuf acture,
with the number of partial Enigma machines required for a
"bombe," for example, going from 6 to 60. Besides being a
time-consuming process, this remanufacture was prohibitively
expensive for a country as poor as Poland, and was not
30
completed prior to Poland's defeat in September 1939.
The situation faced by Poland's cryptology unit also
changed in other ways. The Anschluss in March 1938 and the
Munich Pact in September 1938 generated enough concern that
a previously reluctant element was added to the Enigma
equation: Great Britain. There is no indication that any
cryptologic cooperation with Great Britain ensued in 1938,
but the stage was set for the considerable cooperation that
took place 1 ater .
C. THE FRENCH NEEDLE
Like the Polish role, the French part in the Enigma story
is visible through memoirs, specifically those of Gustave
28

Bertrand, Chief of the French Army Intelligence Service's
31Cryptology Service from 1930 to 1944; Paul Paillole, who
was a member and then Chief of its Counterintelligence
32Section from the mid-1930's to 1944; and Henri Navarre,
who was a member and then Chief of its German Intelligence
Section from the early 1930's to 1944.
Unlike the Poles, however, the lack of official documen-
tation from France is apparently due to a decision not to
release any material from the intelligence services for 60
33years vice the 30-year date set for other types of World
War II documentation. It is doubtful that complete documen-
tation still exists on French participation in the Enigma
affair, since many intelligence files were probably destroyed
as the Germans approached Paris. Bertrand notes in his
memoirs, however, that some of his section's files were
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evacuated to the Vichy Zone in June of 1940, hidden locally
prior to German-
I
tal ia n occupation of the Vichy Zone in
November 1942, " and recovered in 1945. There may be a
considerable amount of information added to the Enigma history
when these files become available to researchers in 2000.
This apparently strong tradition of non-release of
intelligence data may form part of the basis for the general
flavor of disapproval and rejection of Bertrand's story that
one gets in France. Additionally, it would appear that
Bertrand's personality and some of the opinions expressed in
37his book did not endear him to his fellow officers. For
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example, in Bertrand's memoirs he states that he was the
3 8
architect of the entire Enigma operation. He occasionally
makes slighting remarks about his superiors, constantly refers
to his own individual actions or requests to his superiors to
act independently (which were usually granted) and implies
that he, personally, was the moving force behind all of the
French activities.
Since his superiors are all long since dead, it is yery
difficult to determine with any degree of certainty just how
much of the French participation was due to Bertrand, or
whether he simply participated as the Chief of the Cryptology
Section but at the behest or direction of his superiors.
It is interesting to note, however, that no author on
this subject has provided any other names or any indications
that the actions that Bertrand attributes to himself were in
39fact taken or directed by any other quarter.
As Bertrand is no better liked in England than he is in
France, one might expect that some of the British who were
acquainted with French participation would have specifically
attempted to attribute some of his actions to other French
officers. Even those who excoriate him the most, such as
Ronald Lewin, whose few comments on Bertrand resemble a
40
personal attack more than an objective scholarly analysis,
do not seem able to mention another leading French officer.
Whatever the justice of Bertrand's claims to have acted
independently, or of the criticisms of the British and French
30

authors who suggest that he was not quite the kingpin he
implies, the negative reaction to his book leaves Bertrand
and the entire French role as a somewhat forgotten element
in the Enigma story.
It is true that the French Intelligence Service did not
make any of the technical breakthroughs; it also did not
apparently make any great operational contributions, either
to breaking the Eni gma ci phers or to the periods of combat
prior to the fall of France. However, Bertrand and the
French Intelligence Service appear to have acted as the
catalyst which enabled the entire operation to be successfully
concluded. This catalytic role occurred first in December
1932 when Bertrand gave the Asche documents to the Poles and
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to the British, without apparently requiring that anything
be given the French in return. The Poles, as described
earlier, used these documents to very good effect. Oddly
enough, the French apparently were unable to make any
practical use of them, and there is no evidence that the
British did, either.
France was a "winner" in World War I, but exhausted by
its victory. After that experience with Germany, the French
were conscious of a need to watch their eastern neighbor and
devoted a substantial portion of their intelligence effort
to collecting intelligence on Germany.
Like the Poles, the French came out of World War I with
a good reputation for "radio intelligence" and cryptology.
31

Also like the Poles, this experience with hand ciphers did
little to prepare them to deal with the Enigma-based ciphers
when they appeared in German communications after 1926.
There is no information available on early French attacks
on the Enigma ciphers, but Bertrand's book implies that no
progress had been made by the time he took over as Chief of
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the Cryptology Section in 1930.
Bertrand notes that he immediately set about gathering
information on Enigma, which is probably true, since the
gradual shutdown of a previously lucrative intelligence
source would logically have been the greatest problem facing
any chief of cryptology. Interestingly, he seems to have
focussed on procuring collateral information to provide a
hook into the system rather than on theoretical efforts
directly aimed at breaking it, as the Poles did. This
impression may simply be the result of 20-20 hindsight, but
there is no indication that any direct attack was mounted by
French crypto! ogi sts
.
The first - and only - break in the French search for
information came in late 1932, when a young German offered
to provide French Intelligence with documents from the German
Army's Cipher Office (Chi f f ri ers tel 1 e , often abbreviated to
Chistelle), where he worked. Bertrand reports that the
initial reaction by French Intelligence was that "the bride
44
is too beautiful" - too good to be true - describing
someone who spontaneously offers such valuable material that
32

one worries that he may be an agent of his own country seeking
to plant false information in an opposing service. His
45
French code name was Asche and, although recent analysis
46indicates that he was one Hans-Thilo Schmidt, Asche will
be used in this paper since it is the name used in most
works on Enigma.
Asche was the "property" of Navarre's German Intelligence
Section, which handled all German agent intelligence, but,
since his area of potential use was cryptology, Bertrand was
called in, perhaps initially to assess his ability to provide
useful information on German ciphers, and then to receive
Asche's material and give him guidance on what further
information should be acquired and brought to the next meeting
Bertrand, accompanied by various officers from Navarre's
section, by another agent, Lemoine (who may have acted as
interpreter), and by a photographer (who copied Asche's
documents on the spot), had a total of 19 meetings with
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Asche. During these meetings, Bertrand received some 303
ci pher- rel a ted documents from Asche. Only a few of these
were concerned specifically with the Enigma system, but two
48
or three of those few turned out to be highly valuable.
Bertrand, apparently feeling that it would take a
concerted effort on the part of several countries' intel-
ligence services to breach this seemingly impregnable system,
set out to visit the countries that might be expected to see




Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Great Britain. In the
great tradition of intelligence described earlier, his
purpose was not simply to pass out the Asche material to
whomever had a use for it, but to assess the ability and
willingness of each of the countries visited to protect the
Asche documents from compromise and to use them in contribu-
ting to a solution of the Enigma system. Thus, the under-
lying purpose was, as always, primarily to ensure the security
of his own country, and to assist others in their own security
only as a means of achieving the primary goal.
As a result of Bertrand's assessments of these countries,
the Asche documents were given only to Poland and Great
Britain, which appeared to have the greatest potential capa-
bility to contribute to a solution. An agreement to exchange
intercepts was made with Poland and with Czechoslovakia,
which apparently had a lesser cryptologic capability, while
Lithuania and Estonia, which indicated no familiarity or
capability for signals intelligence work, were simply dropped
50from his list of potential partners.
Poland and Czechoslovakia collaborated with France in
exchanging intercepts throughout the 1930's, but Great
51Britain showed no interest at that time. One may presume
that French cryptol ogi sts also made some attempts against
Enigma during the 1930's, but apparently without success.
After the Anschluss in March 1938 and the Munich Pact in
September 1938, concern about German intentions was naturally
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intensified throughout Europe, and the British showed an
increased interest in collaboration. By the end of 1938,
Bertrand and the British were apparently yery worried at the
perceived lack of progress by the Poles, whom they seem to
have recognized as the strongest contenders for a solution.
Bertrand, believing that neither the Poles nor the
British had any more success against Enigma than the French,
proposed to Langer that a deception operation be run to
convince the Germans that Enigma had, in fact, been broken,
and thereby force them to discard Enigma and spend considerable
time, effort, and money adopting some new system. He thought
that this would effectively delay any immediate plans for war
that the Germans might have, since one cannot go to war
believing that enemies are privy to one's high-level military
52
and diplomatic communications.
Interestingly, some authors on Enigma/Ultra have mentioned
Bertrand's proposal with scorn. Lewin, for example, describes
it initially as a shameful proposal (though understandable
from a wimp like Bertrand), then reverses himself later in
the same paragraph and notes it's not such a bad way to
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salvage some benefit out of a failed cryptologic effort.
Langer, of course, advised against this procedure, since
he knew full well that Enigma had been broken for years, so
Bertrand instead proposed a meeting in Paris in January 1939
of cryptologists from all three countries, to discuss the





D. THE BRITISH NEEDLE
World War I was also an exhausting experience for the
British. Unlike the Poles and the French, however, Britain's
relatively greater distance from Germany and sense of pro-
tection afforded by the English Channel may have permitted
a bit longer self-indulgence in ignoring the growing power
of Germany. There are some indications that this ostrich-
like attitude was not held by British Intelligence.
Wi nterbotham, for example, notes that for part of the 1930'
s
he was unable to convince government policy-makers that
55Germany might constitute a threat.
British Intelligence had also come out of World War I in
a strong cryptologic position, but had, of course, no more
experience than any other country with breaking machi ne- based
ciphers. How seriously and how early British Intelligence
focussed on the Enigma problem is difficult to determine,
due to the lack of information in the public domain.
Although Great Britain is the only one of the three
countries involved to release official documents concerning
Enigma/Ultra to the public, this release appears limited to
wartime documentation, i.e., after 1 September 1939. There-
fore, the British side of this story during the 1930's is
also largely limited to recollections, but with an added
twist that makes the early British efforts against Enigma
much more obscure than those of the French and Polish
services: all of the major British participants prior to
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56September 1939 are dead, and none published any information;
the few living minor players are apparently still bound by
the Official Secrets Act, as they have provided little
information on that period.
This leaves two general categories of published material
from the British perspective. One is the memoirs of those
who were involved with Enigma at B.P. subsequent to 1 Sep-
tember 1939. They provide highly accurate and useful infor-
mation on British operations during the war years but tend
to hazard uneducated and frequently biassed guesses
concerning events prior to 1 September 1939. Of those who
fall into this category, only F.W. Winterbotham was a pro-
fessional military intelligence officer prior to the war,
57
and he was not involved with cryptology.
The other category really consists entirely of a small
part of one book: Appendix I to the first volume of F.H.
Hinsley's three-volume study of the effect of British
C O
Intelligence on Strategy and Operations in World War II.
This nine-page Appendix purports to finally clarify the
relative Polish, French, and British contributions to the
breaking of Enigma. Since Hinsley, who had the same back-
ground of wartime work at B.P. as the other British writers,
also had the unique additional advantage of access to all
official intelligence files, including those which have not
been and will not be released to the public, one might expect
that his work would be the definitive analysis on this facet
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of Enigma/Ultra. Unfortunately, however, it is rife with
errors and distortions relating to material in the public
59domain, which makes it very difficult to lean comfortably
c o
on his analysis of probably sketchy records which are not
available for one to check.
Thus, Hinsley's interpretations of the facts available
to him must be viewed with considerable caution. He does,
however, provide a few bits of information not available
elsewhere that help give a general appreciation of the nature
of the British efforts against Enigma in the 1930's. He
confirms that pre-war records show that the French gave some
documents to British Intelligence in the early 1930's -
presumably Bertrand's Asche material - and notes that British
Intelligence was apparently not particularly interested.
Whatever the size of the British effort against Enigma,
by 1938 the bits of information available suggest that the
British had made little or no progress toward a solution,
although they possessed the same materials the Poles had
used to break Enigma, i.e., the Asche papers and a commercial
Enigma. There must have been some serious attention given
to the Enigma problem by 1936, since Hinsley notes that in
that year the British, who were having some success against
non-German Enigmas in the Spanish Civil War, requested
fi 3further information from the French.
The Anschluss in March 1938, and the Munich Pact in
September 1938, seem to have awakened the British government
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to the potential threat from Nazi Germany, and provided the
necessary governmental support for a greater intelligence
effort against Germany, and for greater cooperation with
France and Poland in various areas of intelligence. Prior
to March 1938, the British Intelligence world view probably
tended to see things in terms of British or non-British.
The events of March and September 1938 probably either
created or legitimized a perception and consequent sense that
Germany was an enemy and Poland and France allies. Therefore,
Bertrand's proposal of a three-way meeting in Paris in
January 1939 to discuss the Enigma problem was probably wel-
comed by a reoriented British Intelligence Service that now
saw the Enigma problem as one of far greater urgency than
before.
E. THE PICTURE THROUGH 1938
Except for France's willingness as early as 1932 to share
the Asche documents with other countries, during peacetime
and without requiring an immediate return on this "investment,"
(behavior which may well be unique in the history of intel-
ligence) the counter-Enigma picture through 1938 is essentially
one of three totally separate efforts.
Since the French action in sharing the Asche material on
an initiative basis is so contrary to the typical behavior of
intelligence organizations, or governments for that matter,
it is quite possible that Bertrand's contention, that this
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was the result of his personal initiative, and that he
received only grudging permission to act independently in
this matter, may well be true.
Although all three of the countries involved had
essentially the same assets in the early stages of attacking
Enigma - some highly skilled and experienced cryptol ogi sts
from World War I, a commercial Enigma machine, and the Asche
material - only Poland was able to solve Enigma during this
period. It may have been Poland's greater perception of
danger that caused the radical decision to recruit young,
inexperienced cryptol ogi sts to work on this new problem which
had already defeated the experienced cryptol ogi sts . And one
may speculate that these fresh minds were able to succeed
where wiser heads had failed at leas't partly because they
didn't know what any experienced cryptologist of that time
could have told them: Enigma was impossible to break. Not
knowing the problem was insoluble, they solved it.
Due to the changes the Germans introduced in 1938, how-
ever, the Poles were now in the same boat as the French and
the British, except that they knew Enigma could be broken,
and had considerable reason to feel confident that they
would find a solution to these changes, as they had to the






Ibid., p. 4. Lewin quotes from the report of a Dutch
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matters I don't shrink back from saying that even the
possession of an equal machine with the same electrical
connections both in the ciphering cylinders and in the
other parts of the machine will not enable an unauthorized
person, though he may be an expert in deciphering, to
decipher a certain document or to find out its solution
by scientific methods, unless he knows the whole key...".
Gwido Langer, Report for 1 939-40
(Paris: 12 May 1940).
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Enigma ciphers, for Bertrand's section. It was apparently
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company assigns its own personnel identification number.
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possessed a simple commercial version of the machine."
63. Hinsley, p. 488.
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IV. THE THREADS CROSS ( JANUARY- AUGUST 1939)
A. THE PARIS MEETING (9-11 JANUARY 1939)
The attendees at the Paris meeting included Langer and
Ciezki for Poland, Bertrand and an unnamed cryptologist for
France, and Denniston and two unnamed cryptol ogi sts for Great
Britain. None could read Enigma-based ciphers at that time.
They left the meeting with no more knowledge than when they
arrived, except for an acquaintance with their "opposite
numbers" in the cryptology sections of the other countries.
A brief review of the positions and probable instructions that
the attendees had for this meeting makes obvious the reasons
for its failure.
-The Polish contingent had the most information to give
but, according to Col. Mayer, they had instructions not to
divulge anything about the Polish success with Enigma unless
2the others present had something to offer in return. In
other words, the Poles, with some six years of successful
breaking of Enigma behind them, were concerned but not yet
desperate about their failure to solve the September 1938
changes. Having achieved the impossible in 1932, they
probably believed they could do it again. They were in Paris
essentially to pick up whatever they could from the others to
help them do it faster, not for the purpose of contributing
their knowledge to bailing out the others.
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-The British also were probably there to see what anyone
else knew that might contribute to the British efforts, rather
than to share any information or insights they may have had.
This may seem a leap of logic, since it has been stated
previously that no information is available on British cryp-
tologic efforts or policies prior to 1 September 1939. This
opinion is based on a single nugget of information in Hinsley's
study: British Intelligence was prohibited by government
regulation from exchanging cryptologic information with the
3
French as late as April 1939. Therefore, even if British
Intelligence had made some progress in breaking Enigma, of
which we remain unaware, the British attendees at the Paris
meeting would have been prohibited from sharing it with the
others present. They must, therefore, have attended to find
out what the French and the Poles might know what the British
coul d use
.
-The French, of course, were quite obviously there to
acquire information, since Bertrand had been quite open with
the others concerning his organization's lack of success
against Enigma. Judging by his previous action in giving the
Asche documents to the Poles and the British, it seems likely
that he would have revealed any information he had.
The make-up of the national contingents is also evidence
that each organization saw the meeting as a quid pro quo
occasion. In each case, the officers sent were Chiefs rather
than Indians. The British and Polish attendees had backgrounds
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as working cryptologists but, as one can verify in the Polish
case, at least, did not include any of those who actually
broke Enigma. They were probably expert enough on the problem
to recognize information worth acquiring when they heard it,
but probably not sufficiently familiar with the nitty-gritty
details to usefully engage in working-level analytical dis-
cussions of the ins and outs of deciphering Enigma messages.
They were there as information negotiators, not technicians.
On the other hand, the prior and subsequent positions of
these Polish, French, and British officers in their countries'
cryptologic organizations, and their centrality to pre-war
and wartime counter- Eni gma operations, indicates that the
Paris meeting and the breaking of Enigma were taken seriously
by all of the countries involved. The difficulty was that,
to begin the flow of information at that meeting, someone
needed to prime the pump, and everyone there was either
unwilling or unable to make the first move.
The result of the meeting, then, was a platitude about
sharing any progress each might make, keeping in touch with
each other on this problem, and calling another meeting should
any of the attendees feel that some new development warranted
4
one .
B. BUSINESS AS USUAL ( FEBRUARY- JUNE 1939)
Subsequent to the January 1939 meeting in Paris, all three
countries appear to have continued their efforts separately
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until July 1939. After the Czechosl ovaki an occupation, the
British apparently changed their regulations to permit closer
5
cryptologic cooperation with the French, at least, but there
are no indications that this resulted in any significant
differences in the level of cooperation. Then again, Hinsley
refers to the regulations concerning the French only; if a
change to the regulations did not include the Poles, it would
have had little impact on the Enigma problem, since neither
the 3ritish nor the French apparently had anything to exchange
in that area.
Col. Mayer stated that a decision had been made that, "in
case of a threat of war the Enigma secret must be used as our
Polish contribution to the common cause of defence and divulged
to our future allies."
It is worth noting that the gift was probably not intended
to be without strings. Most French and British writers today
seem to be conveniently confused by 20-20 hindsight into
perceiving Poland's gift as a gallant gesture from one who can
foresee his imminent demise - sort of a "morituri te salutamus."
In view of the subsequent events, it seems have been assumed
that Poland's speedy defeat by Germany was known to be
inevitable. It is conveniently forgotten that Poland
believed itself to be well and truly bound by treaty to two
allies - Great Britain and France - who would join Poland in
its defense against an invader. The Poles seriously expected
to see British and French planes in the air over Warsaw after
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1 September 1939. The gift in July 1939 should be seen as
an acknowledgement that war was inevitable and probably
imminent, not that Poland would be unaided and quickly
defeated. Enigma was probably not intended to be passed on,
like a torch from a falling runner, but shared with allies
who could use their greater economic resources to manufacture
deciphering aids to overcome the September and December 1938
changes and thus enable all three allies to better defend
Poland in the event of a German attack.
C. THE WARSAW MEETING (24-25 JULY 1939)
Whatever the motivations, the meeting in Warsaw was
cal.led by the Poles to reveal the extent of their success to
the French and British attendees. It was attended by Bertrand
and Henri Bracquenie for France; Denniston, Knox, and a
mysterious "Professor Sandwich" for Great Britain; and Mayer,
Langer, Ciezki, Rejewski, Zigalski, and Roczyki for Poland.
The first day was apparently taken up with arriving, settling
in, and having a luncheon. The next day the visitors were
taken to the Polish cryptologic unit's headquarters in the
Pyry Forest, and the full extent of the Polish success - and
recent failure - was revealed. Arrangements were made to
ship two Enigmas and related sets of technical drawings (for
bombes and perforated sheets) to Paris via diplomatic bag,
with one machine and set of drawings to be forwarded to London
This part of the story was completed on 16 August 1939 when
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Bertrand delivered the British portion of the "treasure" to
London .
On that date, then, the three allies were generally on
the same footing, except for the much greater familiarity the
Poles had with Enigma, after deciphering its messages for six
years .
D. ANOTHER STORY
The meeting described above is now generally accepted as
the way the French and British acquired the details of the
brilliant Polish work against Enigma. The first British book
published on Enigma, Wi nterbotham ' s The Ultra Secret
,
told a
different story, however, one which has turned up in several
later books and seems to be the version destined to be
o
enshrined in fiction. Although the "Wi nterbotham story"
does not represent the mainstream of Enigma developments, it
has become popular enough to warrant some discussion. In
brief, the "Wi nterbotham story" follows.
A Polish worker employed at a factory in Germany making
Enigma cipher machines was sacked sometime in the 1 93 ' s , and
returned to Poland, where he contacted British Intelligence
with an offer to tell them everything he knew about the then-
mysterious German cipher machine. British Intelligence
persuaded him to go to Paris, where, after the Deuxieme
Bureau helped set him up in a workshop, he constructed a
large model of the machine he had worked on. With the model
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to help them identify it, British Intelligence determined
that it was a modification of the commercially-available
Enigma machine. Believing that it would be necessary to have
one of the modified Enigma machines in hand in order to break
its ciphers, British Intelligence gave Polish Intelligence
the necessary money and Polish Intelligence "acquired" a
machine, by means not specified. Then, "it was Denniston
himself who went to Poland and triumphantly, but in the
utmost secrecy, brought back the complete, new, electrically
operated Enigma machine" to England. The British then set to
work, invented a machine called the "Bronze Goddess" (like a
bombe?) to help, and, by April 1940, had broken the first
9Enigma-based cipher.
Wi nterbotham * s book appeared in London on 23 October
1974. On 3 November 1974, the first outraged denial by
those aware of Polish and French efforts appeared in the
London Times. Winterbotham then inserted the following
paragraph in the first U.S. edition, which appeared shortly
thereafter:
Since this book was completed, Polish officers now
living in Britain have stated that the Poles constructed
a number of Enigma machines from information extracted
from the factory in Germany coupled with the help of
their own cryptographers, and that it was presumably
one of these which they supplied to us. This may ^/ery
well be true and certainly the Polish mathematicians
and technicians displayed brilliance and great courage,
but the story I have given is the one told to me at
the time. 12




--Wi nterbot ham may have invented it out of whole cloth,
either to avoid revealing anything about "sources and methods"
by which Enigma was broken, or simply to reserve all credit
to the British, or for some other unknown reason;
--The story may have no basis in fact, but still have
been the story Winterbotham was told at the time, possibly
because he had no "need-to-know" the " sources-and-methods "
involved;
--The events Winterbotham described may have occurred
largely as stated, which would not necessarily contradict the
other story: that is, both stories could be true.
There is probably no way of determining now which if any
of these options is correct, unless additional information
should become available. The difference in impact between
the first and second options is negligible, in any case, but
the third is a bit more intriguing.
On the face of it, the "Winterbotham story" appears to
represent an alternate reality which is cancelled by the
reality recounted throughout this paper. However, a closer
examination reveals that they could be parts of the same
real i ty
.
The part of the "Winterbotham story" which concerns the
Polish worker in Paris, for example, is of a failed attempt
made when the British did not know the Poles had any success.
If one ignores the implication that the Britain did not know
that the Enigma machine was in question, the remainder of the
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story is quite possible. It is not only logical that British
Intelligence would be trying eyery means at its disposal, but
it is to be expected.
The other part of the "Winterbotham story" is equally
feasible and suggests a rather charming scenario. The Poles
were aware shortly after the Germans added rotors in December
1938 that their bombes and perforated sheets would have to
be remade, an expensive process that an economically
impoverished Poland could not afford. How nice it would have
been to have British Intelligence appear, as one is pondering
how to afford this expense, and offer a substential sum for
an Enigma machine, of which there are a goodly number availa-
ble, largely because they are being built right there in
Warsaw. Selling British Intelligence one of the Polish Enigma
copies would be a perfectly honorable transaction, benefiting
both the seller and the buyer, without the buyer having any
hint that the seller had been reading Enigma messages and
building Enigma copies for six or seven years.
This scenario is probably a pipedream, but a rather
alluring one, nonetheless. In any case, if any part of it
occurred, it was overtaken by events when the Polish government
decided to give all of the Enigma information to France and





1 . Lewi n
, p. 20 .
2. Mayer, May 1974, p. 4.
3. Hinsley, p. 488.
4. Bertrand, p. 58.
5. Hinsley, p. 488.
6. Mayer, December 1974, p. 2.
7. Garlinski, pp. 42-45.
8. Donald Freed, The Spymaster (New York: Bantam Books,
1981 ) , pp. 50-51
.
9. Winterbotham, pp. 9-16.
10. "R.A.F. Man's Book Describes Breaking of the Nazis' Codes,"
The New York Times
,
25 October 1974, p. 2. The story is
datelined London, 23 October 1974, and describes the book
as "published here today."
11. Michael Pye , "Final Solution to the Enigma," The Times
(London), 3 November 1974, p. 11.
12. Winterbotham, p. 16. It is worth noting that Winterbotham
still managed to accord the Poles only a role as
reconstructors of the machine, not as cryptanalysts, and
he contrived to leave out the French altogether.
56

V. APRES CA, LE DELUGE (SEPTEMBER 1939 - MAY 1945)
A. THE THREADS JOIN (SEPTEMBER 1939 - JUNE 1940)
With the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, all of
Europe changed to a war footing. After a period of non-combat
known to Americans as the phony war, the fighting began again
and, in June 1940, France fell. In the non-lethal war against
Enigma, this period is conveniently divided into two parts:
the period before Enigma was rebroken, when the intelligence
services were mobilizing, organizing, and feverishly developing
means of attacking Enigma, and the period when Enigma messages
were read and used, though unsuccessfully, to support forces
in the field.
1 . The Pattern Forms (September 1939 - December 1939)
This period probably represents the most open period
of cooperation among the three allies in working on the Enigma
problem. Since all three were desperately trying to break
back into Enigma, it was probably obvious to all that everyone
had a "need-to-know" for every detail that might help toward
a solution. Day-to-day communications between the French and
Poles near Paris and the British in London (or B.P.) were via
teletype, over which any keys identified by one side were sent
to the other, as well as any other useful information.
There was apparently also some face-to-face discussion.
Bertrand notes that he made a trip to London during this period;
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Mayer states that Langer also visited London, and that he
4himself visited Vignolles. Hinsley and others have also
indicated that there was at least one British trip (by Turing)
5
to Vignolles in December 1939.
The only note of discord reported during this time is
an indication that the British wanted the Poles to come to
England in December 1939 (because the perforated sheets were
now available?), but apparently they refused. One can easily
see that the Poles would have refused. All of the Polish Army
that had escaped from Poland was located in France, not England
Since the Poles regarded their primary task as one of support
to Polish Intelligence, which was part of the Polish Army, not
as a choice between the French and the British, it is quite
logical that they would choose to remain in France, closer to
their own combat forces and certainly not aware that they
would be at risk because of France falling so rapidly in
June 1940.
a. The Polish Needle
Poland was invaded on 1 September 1939 and defeated
handily in four weeks. Even if its allies had joined in the
fight, it is debatable whether the eventual outcome would have
been any different; without their help, the defeat was fast.
It is somewhat ironic that the country whose military
intelligence organization had solved the most sophisticated
system flourishing in an exotic field such as cryptology was
in the position of pitting horse cavalry against tanks.
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Bertrand notes that radio contact was maintained
via the BLR link with Pyry Forest until 10 September 1939,
which is presumably the date the facility was evacuated. The
Poles took two Enigma machines with them, but destroyed
everything else at Pyry Forest so thoroughly that the Germans
never did discover what work had been done there.
Polish Intelligence, including the cryptologic
section, accompanied the government to its initial exile in
Romania. Some of the cryptol ogi sts made their way to the
British Embassy to seek transport to the West, but had the
bad luck to arrive just as the convoy from the British Embassy
in Warsaw was being processed. The Poles were told to return
later, but decided to try the French Embassy first. There
they were welcomed with open arms, because Bertrand had sent
word to Embassy officials to be on the look-out for them and
to give them eyery assistance in reaching France. Arrangements
were made immediately and, by 1 October 1939, Langer and 14
o
cryptol ogi sts were in France, ready to work.
Their status in France was as an operating unit
of the Polish Army, most of the residue of which was gathering
in France, where the next round of fighting was expected to
begin soon. At no time during the war years did the Polish
cryptologic unit "belong" to French Intelligence; rather, it
collaborated and was colocated with the French cryptologic
unit as a matter of mutual benefit. The Polish cryptologic
unit was given permission by Polish authorities to integrate
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their work with that of the French because Polish intercept
facilities had not been evacuated from Poland, and a cryp-
tologic unit is useless without the raw material provided by
9intercepted messages.
During all of its time in France, this unit reported
administratively to Polish Intelligence Service headquarters,
i.e., Col. Mayer, in London, and operationally to both Polish
and French Intelligence authorities simultaneously. The French
Intelligence authority on the spot was, of course, Bertrand,
who was chief of the expanded cryptologic activity located at
Chateau Vignolles near Paris,
b. The French Needle
The French mobilization transformed Bertrand's
probably small cryptologic unit into what Lewin has referred
to as the "first allied operational intelligence center."
It included personnel of four nationalities working for three
countries in what must have been an administrative nightmare.
In addition to a French team of 75 persons, and the Polish
team of 15, there was a Spanish team of 7 persons, and an
integrated liaison officer from Great Britain who had dedicated
communications (a teletype) with London to ensure that the two
halves of the Enigma operation remained in sync. The Spaniards,
who were enrolled in the French Foreign Legion, were, there-
fore, unlike the Poles, a wholly-owned asset of France. They
were the remnants of the Spanish National Government's
cryptology unit, and had been salvaged by Bertrand from among
the Spanish Civil War refugees in southern France.
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Bertrand mentions only the Enigma work of the
Polish team, so the tasks of the French and Spanish teams are
uncertain. Since France had the full benefit of the Polish
team's work on Enigma, it is possible that the other teams
were never tasked with Enigma deciphering. The Spanish team
1 2
worked on Spanish and Italian ciphers and the French team
may have performed other tasks, such as the analytical and
evaluative function described by various British authors as
done on the British side by Hut 3 at B.P.
c. The British Needle
Like the French, the British military establishment
expanded to wartime strength and organization upon the German
invasion of Poland. For MI-6, this included the permanent
move of the cryptologic organization to Bletchley Park and
1 3the recruitment of many additional personnel. A group of
scientists, mathematicians, and university professors had been
"short-listed" previously for wartime cryptology duty, and
these were soon augmented by additional personnel. The
organization and operations of B.P. have been amply described
by various British authors and will not be further discussed
here.
One may assume that a great deal of attention was
immediately devoted to the problem of rebreaking Enigma. The
Polish Enigma and technical drawings were, of course, available
How much impact the Polish work had on the British methods of
solution has been a point of great controversy.
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At a minimum, in September 1939, the presence of
the Polish Enigma resolved the British lack of knowledge of
1 4the internal wheel wirings. At a maximum, the British
simply copied all of the Polish methods (expanding the aids
to deal with the additional rotors). These two extremes have
been well expressed by two previous commentators. The truth,
as one might expect in such a complex arena, probably lies
somewhere in between.
The latter position was adopted by Bertrand,
though he never specifically denigrated British efforts, when
he wrote:
As for the Polish cryptanal ysts , to them alone goes
all the credit and all the glory of having carried through
to completion, technically, this incredible adventure,
thanks to their skill and tenacity, unequalled in any
other country in the world!^
The judgement that the Polish impact was minimal
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recovering the wheel wirings, though an additional
benefit-- imponderable but potentially of great
psychological value--was the yery discovery that the
Poles had had such significant success. ^ 6
Having dismissed the fact that the Poles conceived
the concept of using Bombes to help recover the keys, which is
a lot like saying that Einstein's theory of relativity is no
credit to him, because someone else would have thought of it
eventually, Hinsley removes the Poles neatly from the team
playing the game and places them in the position of cheer-
leaders: their only real gift "imponderable but potentially
of great value--was the yery discovery that the Poles had had
such significant success."
While one may certainly accuse Bertrand of being
somewhat biased against the doubtless brilliant British work,
Hinsley appears to be distorted excessively far in the other
di recti on.
Since there is apparently some official stricture
still in effect regarding the technical apparatus and
methodology used at B.P., we may never know clearly how much
each group contributed to the permanent solution of Enigma,
but it seems safe to say that kudos are deserved all around.
2. The Pattern Blurs (January 1940 - June 1940)
The first break into the German military Enigma since
December 1938 occurred, according to three different sources,
on 28 October 1939 (Bertrand); 17 the latter part of December
1939 (Hinsley); 18 and 17 January 1940 (Langer). 19 I tend to
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feel most comfortable with Langer's date as the likeliest, for
several reasons.
--Langer's report was written in 1940, when the memory
of that moment was quite fresh. Also, since his report lists
126 daily settings broken and the date each was broken, it
was probably compiled from a log in which entries were made of
events as they occurred.
--Bertrand's date is for the daily setting which Langer
says was broken on 17 January 1940. Bertrand may simply have
made an error.
--Hinsley's date corresponds to the time that Turing
brought the set of perforated sheets on which the break was
made to Paris. It is possible that, whatever the source of
Hinsley's information, the date for bringing the sheets over
was confused with the date they were first used successfully
It is interesting that the break was made using per-
forated sheets rather than "bombes." In fact, there were as
yet no bombes available, since the Poles had destroyed theirs
when evacuating Warsaw, the French hadn't built any, and the
British were still building theirs.
Hinsley refers to these sheets as "GC and CS punched-
21hole sheets," yet the fact that they were carried to Paris
and the break made by the Poles there suggests that the Poles
had some expertise or familiarity with using these sheets
that the British didn't have, else they would have simply




Therefore, it seems likely that these were simply a British
remanufacture of the Polish perforated sheets for which
technical specifications had been provided at the Warsaw
meeting in July 1939. The timing of this event also suggests
that the reason for the British invitation for the Poles to
transfer to London in December 1939 may have been that the
first set of sheets had been completed and the Poles could
demonstrate them and train the British in their use.
In any event, the first break was probably made on or
not too long before 17 January 1940, and the keys and settings
started to tumble out more and more quickly after that first
break. During January and part of February 1940, it seems to
have taken about two weeks to break a key, then several days
to one week until April 1940, then a couple of days during
April, and, in May and June 1940, keys were being broken out
22the same day or the next day. Some of this constant
acceleration may have been due to increasing familiarity with
the hand methods, but most probably was related to implemen-
tation at B.P. of various mechanical aids. The shift from a
two-week to a one-week delay in February 1940 is roughly
23
congruent with Wi nterbo tham' s comment that he was shown the
"Bronze Goddess" - probably a Polish-type bombe? - early in
1940. Likewise, Hinsley notes that the first British-made




Langer's report also notes that 83% of the keys broken
25during this period came from B.P. This is hardly surprising,
since all of the mechanical aids were located there. There
is no evidence, incidentally, that the British were discussing
with the Poles or the French any of their technical advances
in constructing bombes. Welchman, who was an integral part of
the British team, indicated recently that he didn't know until
1981 that there was an Enigma deciphering operation in France
This would strongly suggest that the British were working in
isolation on their cryptologic effort.
The halcyon days of full cooperation were already over.
The French and Polish units were probably still cooperating
fully because they were physically and functionally inter-
dependent, but the British, remotely located and functioning
independently, were already favoring " need-to- know" over "common
cause. "
Like Poland in September 1939, France fell more
quickly than anyone would have thought possible after the
German attack of 10 May 1940. German advances were so quick
that Vignolles was evacuated to Paris a few days after the
10 May 1940 attack. When Paris was threatened, the entire
cryptologic operation moved out by bus and car toward the
south, following the retreating French government. At each
stop, the deciphering efforts continued, and contact was
maintained by radio with London. When the armistice became




Officer returned to London from Cazaux airfield, the Poles
and the Spaniards were flown to Algeria from Toulouse air-
field and, when the armistice arrived, French personnel were
demobilized. The radio link with London ended 28 June 1940.
Britain seemed to stand alone in Europe, with the fragile
protection of the English Channel and the growing ability to
read a lot of Hitler's mail.
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B. TANGLED THREADS (JULY 1940 - DECEMBER 1942)
This story of "needles and haystacks" would seem over at
this point, with only the MI-6 needle surviving in the British
haystack. The Poles and Bertrand, being nothing if not
innovative, however, soon got back into the game, albeit only
peri pheral ly.
Bertrand, along with other professional French military
personnel, was not demobilized with the conscripts in July
1940, but was retained on active duty as a member of the small
Vichy Army permitted by the Armistice. His branch of service,
as before, was intelligence and, along with quite a few other
French military intelligence personnel, he was simultaneously
an officer of the Vichy S.R. and of the "shadow" S.R. organi-
zation known as Reseau Kleber, which was pro-Allies and anti-
Nazi. It was in this latter role, presumably, that he
reconstructed his cryptologic unit (Spanish and Polish teams
28
only) at a chateau near Nimes code-named P.C. Cadix.
While ostensibly working as a Vichy communications
security organization, P.C. Cadix began deciphering Enigma
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and other signals traffic and, in March 1941, reestablished
direct communications with London (MI-6) via clandestine
29
radio. During this time, then, Bertrand was personally
operating in four roles: responsible to Vichy for the overt
work of his unit; responsible to Reseau Kleber (and thence to
Giraudists in Algiers) for clandestine signals intelligence
on the Germans; responsible to London (and thence to B.P.)
for contributions to Enigma and other deciphering activities;
and responsible otherwise to MI-6 for agent intelligence.
He made some 100 trips across the demarcation line to
German-occupied Paris. Most of these were as a Resistance
agent of MI-6 and Reseau Kleber, to contact a source he had
30developed at the German Embassy. Some, however, were
related to Enigma operations.
During the phony war orders had been placed with a Paris
manufacturing concern for various parts of Enigma machines,
based on the Polish specifications provided in July 1939.
Since the parts had not been received prior to the fall of
France in June 1940, Bertrand made 26 trips to Paris to pick
up Enigma parts, which the Poles assembled into four additional
31Enigma machines at P.C. Cadix.
The situation of the Polish team during this time was
even more complicated than Bertrand's. Langer and his
subordinates returned to France in October 1940 with the
approval of Polish Intelligence authorities in Algiers and
London. Once again they were working h-and-in-glove with
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Bertrand and French Intelligence but, as before the fall of
32France, they were subordinated to Polish Intelligence.
So, while Bertrand was communicating with M I - 6 in two of
his roles, at least part of the time using a one-time-pad
cipher which could not even be read by anyone else at Cadix,
the Poles were communicating with Polish Intelligence head-
33quarters in London, over the same radio, but using their
own cipher, which Bertrand couldn't read. They also operated
as part of Bertrand's roles in providing signals intelligence
to MI- 6 for B.P., to Vichy, and to Reseau Kleber. This makes
them even with Bertrand with four roles each, but the Poles
went Bertrand one better.
The only restriction the "men of good will" at Vichy who
knew about Reseau Kleber had placed on Bertrand's (and,
presumably, Reseau Kleber's) connection with M I - 6 was that no
information about Vichy itself be passed. The Poles solved
that problem by passing intelligence on Vichy directly by
radio to a Polish intelligence network in Algeria called the
34
Rygor Network, supposedly without Bertrand's knowledge.
This situation continued until early November 1942, when
the German occupation of the Vichy Zone in reaction to the
Allied landings in North Africa put a stop to French and
Polish participation in the Enigma saga. By the end of 1942,
Bertrand and his wife had temporarily gone to ground on the
Riviera, the Spaniards had been evacuated, and the Poles were
attempting to escape to Spain and then Britain via the Pyrenees. 35
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C. THE ENDS (JANUARY 1943 - MAY 1945)
Having followed Bertrand and the Poles through their
peripatetic pre-war and wartime search for Enigma, one cannot
simply leave them in hiding in southern France.
Bertrand continued to function as part of Reseau Kleber
until January 1944 when, on his 101st trip to Paris since the
fall of France, he was arrested by the notorious Masuy, a
French collaborator with the Abwehr. During his questioning
he was told that the Germans had arrested and shot Asche, and
had Lemoine in custody. They apparently knew that Asche had
sold the French some cipher documents, but still believed
that Enigma was unbreakable. Bertrand convinced Masuy and
company that he would be willing to turn Reseau Kleber against
the Allies, and then went into hiding until May 1944, when he
was lifted out of France by an MI-6 network, arriving in
London just two days before D-Day. Bertrand was then Chief
of Intelligence to General Koenig's French Forces of the
Interior, which was by this time an Allied organization
coordinating all Resistance activities during Allied advances
37
in France. Bertrand and his wife returned to France in
38September 1944 and, according to Bertrand, he recovered
Enigma machines and files at P.C. Cadix and began operating
39
again in January 1945, continuing until the end of the war.
40Some of the Poles, including Rejewski and Zigalski,
escaped over the Pyrenees in early 1943, and went on to London
They were not permitted at Bletchley Park, but worked with a
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Polish Signals Intelligence Unit near London on non-Enigma
ciphers.
Langer, Ciezki, and three other Poles were captured by
the Germans while trying to escape over the Pyrenees. They
spent the remainder of the war as prisoners. Langer and
41Ciezki survived, but two of the others died.
The threads ended, then, as separately as they had begun
each group of cryptol ogi sts was completely isolated from the
others. The security consciousness (bordering on paranoia)
which is typical of intelligence organizations had regained
the ascendancy, with the "family jewels" now in British
possession rather than Polish. The British, of course, went
on to make the counter-Enigma operation into Ultra - an
achievement of interception, deciphering, analysis, and
dissemination on a scale that probably would have astounded
the Polish and French pioneers, who were never permitted to





1. Wldyslaw Kozaczuk, "Enigma Solved, " Cryptologia
,
VI,
1 (January 1982), p. 32. Kozaczuk reports on a
conversation he had in 1975 with Henri Bracquenie, who
was responsible for establishing the procedures for these
information exchanges. Bracquenie informed him that
Enigma machines were used to encipher these communications!
2
. Bertrand
, p . 76
.
3. Mayer, May 1974, p. 5.
4. Mayer, December 1974, p. 4.
5. Hinsley, p. 493.
6. Christopher Kasparek and Richard A. Woytak, "In Memoriam
Marian Rejewski," Cryptol ogia
, VI, 1 (January 1982),
p. 21 .
7. Bertrand, p. 69.
8. Kasparek and Woytak, "In Memoriam...", p. 21.




1 1 . Bertrand
, pp. 70-72.
12. Ibid., p . 71.
13. Calvocoressi, pp. 12-13.
14. Twinn notes: "The wartime problem was first, to reconstruct
the particular internal connexions used by the Germans and,
secondly, to deduce the daily settings."
1 5. Bertrand
, p. 61
16. Hinsley, p. 494.
1 7 . Bertrand
, p. 76.







20. Oddly enough, Hinsley, who states firmly (p. 493) that
"an Army Enigma key (the key named the Green at GC and
CS) for 28 October was broken in the second half of
December," seems to contradict himself in the second
volume of his three-volume work. In Appendix 4 ("Enigma
Keys Attacked by GC and CS up to mid-1943") to the second
volume, he lists (p. 662) German Army Enigma Key "Green"
as having been broken on 18 January 1940.




, pp. 1 -5 .
23. Wi nterbotham , p. 15.
24. Hinsley, p. 494.
25. Langer, p. 5
.
26. Wei chman, p . 17.
27. Bertrand, pp. 100-103.
28. Ibid.
, pp. 107, 109-110.
29. Ibid.
, pp. 110-111 .
30. Ibid., pp. 111-112. Hinsley notes Bertrand's contributions
to MI-6 as a source of agent intelligence in several places
(pp. 94, 130, 474, 701) in Volume II of his study of British




32. Mayer, May 1974, p. 7.
33. Ibid.
,
May 1974, p. 7.
34. Ibid.
,
May 1974, p. 7.
35. Bertrand, pp. 140-143.
36. Ibid.
, pp. 158-204.








40. Roczyki had died in 1942 when the ship which he was
returning from Algiers was sunk (Bertrand, p. 124).
41
.






Anyone who has come this far through the Enigma-tic maze
is entitled to wonder what interest it may have for a reader
or, for that matter, a writer 40 or 50 years later. Should
it be perceived as a historical puzzle that, much like a
detective story, is satisfying simply to unravel? Could it
be viewed primarily as an adventure story, filled as it is
with secret codes, brave heroes, wily spies, undercover
Resistance organizations, and lots of doubling and tripling
of various intelligence organizations? Or, might one find in
this story useful lessons for today, in the same way that it
has become fashionable for books on wartime Enigma/Ultra
operations to focus on the impact the Ultra decrypts had on
the conduct of the war?
Certainly, the story functions well as a historical puzzle.
Since most of the literature in English on Enigma/Ultra to date
has concerned the operations of Bletchley Park in the war years,
and virtually all has described events from a single perspective,
the research for this paper was a bit like detective work.
Small clues to the contacts among the three intelligence services
involved led to wholly unsuspected areas of information, such
as the quadruple- and quintuple-hatting of the French and
Polish members of P.C. Cadix.
The heroic adventure content of the story must also be
acknowledged, particularly in the French and Polish operations
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in Vichy France, which rival tales of James Bond for danger,
intrigue, and derring-do. Bertrand's experiences alone have
been described by a British authority on World War II
Resistance as a classic case history of what a truly pro-
fessional intelligence officer can accomplish under incredibly
adverse conditions, a point worth highlighting for those who
prefer to consider that the debacle of the Battle of France
represented the totality of French capabilities in World War
II.
And, for those who expect to learn something useful from
e^/ery story, a tentative moral can be drawn from this one:
some of the countries involved, by adhering strictly to the
"need-to-know" and "sources-and-methods " principles in the
1930's, put all of the Allies in a worse position in 1939 than
they would have been had the needs of "common cause" been given
more attention sooner.
For Poland, World War II brought total defeat and apparently
permanent submergence in the Soviet bloc. For France, the war
brought shocking military defeat and five years of humiliating
occupation by a foreign power. And for Great Britain, it was
five years of a harrowing and costly razor's edge. For all
three and for the other countries involved on both sides, World
War II represented a huge cost in human life and property.
But--what if the Poles had informed Bertrand and the French
of their success against Enigma in 1933 instead of 1939? What
if the British had been more interested in collaborating with
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the French and the Poles in 1932 instead of 1939? Since the
Poles were reading Enigma traffic freely during most of the
1930's, one can assume that the British and the French would
have been, too. With the solid high-level intelligence pro-
vided by Enigma to back up their warnings, would the Western
intelligence organizations have been better able to convince
their governments of German rearmament and Nazi intentions?
If so, would the governments still have persisted so long in
their appeasement policies, or might a harder line have been
adopted sooner?
The events which led to World War II are far too complex
to speculate on the specific effects early access to Enigma
decrypts might have had, but this thesis posits that the
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